Happy Earth Day, 2023

One thing people say about having a day (or even month) to celebrate x is that it tends to cause people not to care about it the rest of the time.  Who knows if that’s true but you definitely don’t hear people making that argument about Memorial Day.  In any case, let’s assume that having a day on the calendar in which we officially celebrate the Earth is no objection to it.  But why celebrate Earth?  There could be religious reasons (because god made it, or is it), there could be aesthetic reasons (because it is AWEsome and wondrous), there could be anthropocentrically ecological reasons (because of how it supports human life—these reasons are arguably not ethical reasons), and there could be deeply ecological reasons (the whole earth—not just some part of it—is intrinsically valuable).  These reasons can overlap, of course.   

One thing that people sometimes say is that “this is the only Earth we have.”  This might be true but it depends on what is meant by “Earth” and “we.”  Consider the many-worlds hypothesis (or, in philosophy, David Lewis’s account of possible worlds).  On such accounts, there is not only one Earth but infinitely many Earths.  And there is not one you but infinitely many yous in infinitely many different worlds.  Suppose that in a month, our Earth is struck and annihilated by a meteor.  If there is only one Earth, this seems like a tragedy (to put it lightly).  If there are infinitely many, it seems less so.  It’s funny how considerations of uniqueness (or lack thereof) can totally shift something’s value in our minds.  I’ll grant that if any of these hypotheses are true, the Earth’s value (and my own value) is somewhat muted or changed in the “grand scheme of things.”  Think of Earths on the many-worlds hypotheses like different individual people.  Each Earth has intrinsic value, just like each person does, and differs from every other Earth.  Even if there are infinitely many people (which there are on the many-worlds hypothesis), that doesn’t seem to undermine each individual’s intrinsic worth.  Thus, on this analogy, the existence of infinitely many Earths would not undermine the intrinsic worth of the actual Earth (i.e., the earth in which WE exist).  But even if infinitely many x’s doesn’t undermine the value of those x’s, it should still create a bit of humility regarding our own importance in the grand scheme of things.

 

For me, the value of the Earth is in the interaction with it, the feelings of awe and respect and humility we can experience from that interaction, the knowledge and self-knowledge we can from such interactions.  Regardless of whether there are infinitely many me’s interacting with infinitely many Earths, I can’t help but value actual Earth (the one in which I exist) for all the reasons stated above. Perhaps that value is less cosmic than we imagine if we are the only Earth and the only me.  On my view, the Earth’s value is somewhat anthropocentric—by taking an intrinsically valuing attitude towards it, by having a proper humility and respect for our place in it, by being held in awe of it, by learning from it, I am able to live well.  The same goes for my counterparts on the infinitely many different Earths.

 

What if Earth is a simulation?  Does this change its value?  It depends on the reasons one values it.  For example, if this Earth is a simulation, then certain religious reasons for valuing it could be undermined (unless god created the simulation, I guess).  Perhaps some naturalistic reasons for valuing it could also be undermined but it would depend on the details of the simulation.  Suppose the simulation was given certain basic constraints and everything just evolved via non-teleological principles, such as natural selection.  In such a case, I’m not sure that the fact that this is a simulation would undermine any of the kinds of naturalistic value I’ve mentioned above.  Perhaps there were millions of failed simulations and only this one “made it.”  Now we are back to the uniqueness idea again.  Unless there are many-worlds of the simulation-creator (and thus infinitely many simulations that “made it”).  In any case, simulations are just as physically real as non-simulations, as long as those simluations simulate a physics, chemistry, biology, etc.  In that case, the only difference between a simulation and non-simulation is that the simulation has an extra “level” below physics (which would be the lowest level in a non-simulated world).  Should that extra lower level (call it a computational level) undermine the reality of the physical levels above it?  I think not.  Does the fact that livers and trees and bricks are instantiated by a lower level of physical entities with surprising and radically different characteristics undermine the fact that there are livers and trees and bricks?  No.  Thus, it shouldn’t in the case of the computational level, either.