The personal-structural racism cycle in a colorblind society
It occurred to me the other day that there is a simple way of thinking about how racism is maintained at the individual level. People like to distinguish between personal and structural racism and explain how one can exist without the other, but I think the truth of the matter is much messier (of course). As my students are fond of pointing out, individual/personal racism sustains structural racism and structural racism, in turn, sustains individual racism. I take this to be a truism, but figuring out how, specifically, this happens is far from easy. So here's one simple idea: call it the "personal-structural racism cycle."
Take the criminality of black males, as an example. There exists, culturally in the U.S., a stereotype that links blacks (esp. black males) to criminality. There are good structural explanations for how black males were made to be criminal (as DuVernay's 13th has recently brought to popular attention). But I'm interested in the effects such stereotypes can have on an individual, despite the fact that that individual publicly disavows such stereotypes (as is the case for a society that ostensibly upholds the value of "colorblindness"). So here's the idea. The existence of stereotypes (often held implicitly), such as "blacks are criminals," can come to have an influence on us through our memories of events and thus can affect how information is stored in long-term memory. So even if I would not publicly avow the idea that blacks are more criminal/dangerous/violent than whites, that stereotype can exert an influence on my experience of the world. Suppose that although Bob explicitly rejects such stereotypes but finds that when he's walking down the street at night and sees a black male, he is a little bit on edge, a little bit afraid. After the man passes, Bob chastises himself. But a memory trace of the event is nevertheless laid down. (We know that memories are tightly integrated with emotional valences.) Over time, as similar experiences and their memory traces accumulate, the stereotype is further reinforced, regardless of the fact that Bob does not avow this stereotype. Now consider a scenario in which Bob is a judge and has to make a judgment about the "dangerousness" of a defendant in order to make a determination about bail. Perhaps Bob is (ceteris paribus) more likely to judge a black criminal more dangerous than a white criminal. This pattern of Bob's judgments could trace, in part, to his memory traces of encounters with black individuals like the one described above. It is important to see that the influence of Bob's experience on his judgments and perceptions is, in a certain sense, evidentiary, since he is simply drawing on his experience of the world to make judgments about it. This is the epistemic condition of all humans, after all. The problem, of course, is that Bob's experiences were themselves guided by a prejudiced stereotype--one that he himself rejects (in the sense that he does not avow it).
The reason I think this is important is that it gives some kind of validation to individuals' experiences, while nevertheless rejecting that those experiences, because under the influence of the prejudicial stereotype, accurately represent the world. Sometimes one's fears are irrational, because not based on all the relevant evidence, but that doesn't mean that those fears aren't fears. The causal story about the etiology of the irrational fears is important because it acknowledges one's experiences are real without acquiescing the prejudicial stereotypes that contribute to those experiences. James Baldwin pointed out that we have to be willing to look at ourselves and that, with regards to race, (white) Americans simply weren't willing to confront their private selves for fear of what they may find. (As if to confirm this point, the IAT homepage gives a warning to people who wish to proceed with the test.) It is misguided and overly simplistic to assume that ordinary individuals don't contribute to structural racism. It is misguided to think that as long as we are not racists then everything is fine. Thus, the fact that otherwise "good people" with "blind spots" can nevertheless contribute to ongoing structural racism is an important thing to both recognize and talk about.
Take the criminality of black males, as an example. There exists, culturally in the U.S., a stereotype that links blacks (esp. black males) to criminality. There are good structural explanations for how black males were made to be criminal (as DuVernay's 13th has recently brought to popular attention). But I'm interested in the effects such stereotypes can have on an individual, despite the fact that that individual publicly disavows such stereotypes (as is the case for a society that ostensibly upholds the value of "colorblindness"). So here's the idea. The existence of stereotypes (often held implicitly), such as "blacks are criminals," can come to have an influence on us through our memories of events and thus can affect how information is stored in long-term memory. So even if I would not publicly avow the idea that blacks are more criminal/dangerous/violent than whites, that stereotype can exert an influence on my experience of the world. Suppose that although Bob explicitly rejects such stereotypes but finds that when he's walking down the street at night and sees a black male, he is a little bit on edge, a little bit afraid. After the man passes, Bob chastises himself. But a memory trace of the event is nevertheless laid down. (We know that memories are tightly integrated with emotional valences.) Over time, as similar experiences and their memory traces accumulate, the stereotype is further reinforced, regardless of the fact that Bob does not avow this stereotype. Now consider a scenario in which Bob is a judge and has to make a judgment about the "dangerousness" of a defendant in order to make a determination about bail. Perhaps Bob is (ceteris paribus) more likely to judge a black criminal more dangerous than a white criminal. This pattern of Bob's judgments could trace, in part, to his memory traces of encounters with black individuals like the one described above. It is important to see that the influence of Bob's experience on his judgments and perceptions is, in a certain sense, evidentiary, since he is simply drawing on his experience of the world to make judgments about it. This is the epistemic condition of all humans, after all. The problem, of course, is that Bob's experiences were themselves guided by a prejudiced stereotype--one that he himself rejects (in the sense that he does not avow it).
The reason I think this is important is that it gives some kind of validation to individuals' experiences, while nevertheless rejecting that those experiences, because under the influence of the prejudicial stereotype, accurately represent the world. Sometimes one's fears are irrational, because not based on all the relevant evidence, but that doesn't mean that those fears aren't fears. The causal story about the etiology of the irrational fears is important because it acknowledges one's experiences are real without acquiescing the prejudicial stereotypes that contribute to those experiences. James Baldwin pointed out that we have to be willing to look at ourselves and that, with regards to race, (white) Americans simply weren't willing to confront their private selves for fear of what they may find. (As if to confirm this point, the IAT homepage gives a warning to people who wish to proceed with the test.) It is misguided and overly simplistic to assume that ordinary individuals don't contribute to structural racism. It is misguided to think that as long as we are not racists then everything is fine. Thus, the fact that otherwise "good people" with "blind spots" can nevertheless contribute to ongoing structural racism is an important thing to both recognize and talk about.
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